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Admiralty Law
by Robert S. Glenn, Jr.'
George M. Earle"
and
Marc G. Marling***
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided nine admiralty
cases with written opinions in 1998. With one exception, these cases did
not involve issues of first impression. They instead fell into the
following categories: cases that were decided with reference to existing
law; a case in which the court's decision put it at odds with the holding
of other circuit courts; a case in which the court's holding continued an
expansive trend in maritime law; and a case of first impression involving
important constitutional issues.
The cases that were decided with reference to existing law were three
admiralty jurisdiction cases, two cases involving contracts,' one case
arising out of tort,2 a case involving maintenance and cure, 3 and two
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1. Inbesa America, Inc. v. M/V ANGLIA, 134 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 1998) and Wilkins
v. Commercial Inv. Trust Corp., 153 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998).
2. Broughton v. Florida Int'l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861 (11th Cir. 1998).
3. Aksoy v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc., 137 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1998).
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cargo cases, one of which is discussed in a fifty page opinion that is a
primer of cargo law.4 The case that created a conflict among the
circuits was a case that arose under the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act ("LHWCA").5 It was settled and dismissed after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, leaving the Second and Ninth Circuits
in conflict with the Eleventh over exactly what a "pier" is under the
LHWCA.' The "expansive trend" case involved the relationship between
the maritime wrongful death remedy and state wrongful death
statutes.7 The case raising an issue of first impression, on a return
appearance before the court, presented the court with an opportunity to
examine the relationship between Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity and the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act and its
procedural counterpart, Rule F of the Supplemental Rules.'

I.

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

In Inbesa America, Inc. v. MIV ANGLIA, 9 the Eleventh Circuit
confronted the question of whether a contract between a terminal
operator and a vessel charterer which covered dockage, stevedoring,
unloading, stuffing and stripping, securing, and wharfage 'was, as a
whole, maritime in nature, thus giving rise to admiralty jurisdiction.' °
Admiralty jurisdiction over contracts involving cargo traditionally exists
when the contract is maritime, that is, the contract is concerned with
getting a ship and its cargo from one point to another, including the
chartering of the vessel, carriage of goods or passengers, loading and
discharge of cargo, and obtaining voyage supplies, repairs, and towing." The court in Inbesa held that dockage and stevedoring are
clearly maritime because charges related to the needs of a vessel lying
at a dock, as well as the stowing of cargo aboard that vessel, are
maritime in nature. 2 However, the court held that the other categories
of service are nonmaritime cargo handling."3 In reaching this decision,

4.
1998).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1994).
Brooker v. Durocher Dock & Dredge, 133 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1998).
American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 153 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir 1998).
Bouchard Transportation Co. v. Updegraff, 147 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1998).
134 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1036-37.
Rea v. Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599, 608 (1890).

12.

134 F.3d at 1037 (quoting 1 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY

Hale Container Line, Inc. v. Houston Sea Packing Co., 137 F.3d 1455 (11th Cir.

at 14-25 (7th ed. 1997)).
13. Id.

§ 215,
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the court relied upon Luvi Trucking, Inc. v. Sea-Land Services, Inc. 4
"It has long been the rule that contracts involving cargo are maritime
only to the extent the cargo is on a ship or is being loaded on or off a
ship." 5 The court found that services such as the unloading of trucks
and railcars and the stuffing and stripping of containers, while
important parts of the transportation of cargo, were not "necessary" for
the operation of the vessel.' 6 The court drew this distinction between
stevedoring and shore-side cargo handling and held shore-side cargo
handling to be nonmaritime in nature. v
As for wharfage, the court noted the term "wharfage" is often
synonymous with "dockage," which has been held to be a maritime
service.'8 However, in this case, wharfage was a charge assessed on
the cargo moving through Inbesa's terminal. Therefore, the court
concluded that this wharfage charge was not dockage and was instead
related to shore-side cargo handling services.' 9 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that the
district court did not have admiralty jurisdiction over the nonmaritime
aspects of the contract because they were separable from the contract.2 °
In Wilkins v. Commercial Investment TRust Corp.,21 the Eleventh
Circuit examined whether admiralty jurisdiction existed when investors
in a new cruise line posted a letter of credit or advanced funds to pay for
refurbishment of the vessel. The investors asserted a maritime lien
against the vessel.22 The questions before the court were whether the
refurbishment contracts constituted maritime contracts for the purpose
of jurisdiction and whether the investors who had paid the refurbishers
were subrogated to the refurbishers' maritime lien rights.2"
Traditionally, a prerequisite to contractual maritime liens was that
the underlying contract concern a subject matter within admiralty
jurisdiction.24 However, in Wilkins the court worked in reverse, first
deciding whether the investors held maritime liens by way of subroga-

14. 650 F.2d 371 (1st Cir. 1981).
15. Id. at 373 (citing The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866)).
16. 134 F.3d at 1037.
17. Id. at 1038.
18. Id. (citing 1 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 213, at 14-21).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 153 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998).
22. Id. at 1274.
23. Id. at 1276 (citing E.S. Binnings, Inc. v. The M/V Saudi Riyadh, 815 F.2d 660, 662
(11th Cir. 1987) overruled in part on other grounds by Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines,
Inc., 500 U.S. 603 (1991)).
24. 815 F.2d at 662.
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tion. The court found that the investors had not acquired maritime liens
because not all creditors whose funds discharge a maritime lien acquire
a maritime lien.25 Because the investors' funds were advanced to Royal
Company, the operating company which was overseeing the refurbishment, rather than to the owner of the vessel, the court found that the
investors had advanced money to pay off a demand by the owner and
that it would be "unjust to presume that the vessel would end up
encumbered, anyway-because of the Royal companies' apparent default
in reimbursing their investors as well as the vessel's refurbishers.""
Therefore, because credit was extended to the operator and not to the
vessel itself, no maritime lien existed."
The court also held that the advances were not made on behalf of the
owner or the vessel itself but to a party with no property interest in the
vessel.28 Royal Company, the intended operator of the vessel, had
agreed to oversee and fund the repairs and refurbishment of the vessel,
but did not possess any ownership rights in the vessel. Royal was
unable to raise the funds to pay for the expenses. In an effort to raise
capital, Royal issued promissory notes to the investors, promising
repayment with interest. However, Royal did not have any collateral in
the vessel.2 9 The court found that there was no presumption that the
money was advanced on the credit of the vessel, and because the rights
of the investors were not subrogated to the maritime liens of the
refurbishers, there was no need to investigate further whether admiralty
jurisdiction existed. °
In Broughton v. FloridaInternational Underwriters,Inc. 1 the court
considered whether a vessel owner's claim for breach of duty by a
surplus line insurance broker met the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction. 2 The broker placed coverage for the vessel with an insurance
company that was alleged to be financially unsound. The insured's
shrimp trawler capsized and was totally destroyed. The hull underwriter failed to pay Broughton's claim against his policy. Broughton brought
a tort claim under Georgia law against the broker for breach of alleged
statutory duties requiring an insurance broker to ensure that an
insurance company is financially sound before placing coverage with it

25. 153 F.3d at 1276 (citing Tramp Oil & Marine Limited v. M/V "MERMAID 1," 805
F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1986)).
26. Id. at 1277.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29.

Id. (citing The Emily Souder, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 666, 671 (1873)).

30. Id. at 1277-78.
31. 139 F.3d 861 (11th Cir. 1998).
32. Id. at 864-65.
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and requiring the broker to inform the policy holder if the carrier
becomes financially unsound.3 3 The court examined whether this was
a subject within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction.3 4
The test for establishing admiralty jurisdiction in a tort case is the
locality plus the nexus to traditional maritime activity test,35 often
referred to as the "locality plus plus" test. The locality portion of the
test requires the tort to have occurred on navigable waters or have been
caused by a vessel operating on navigable waters.3" The nexus
requirement contains two queries (hence the "plus plus"): first, whether
"the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce,"
and second, "whether the general character of the activity giving rise to
the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity."37 The Eleventh Circuit decided Broughton solely on the
locality requirement. Because the tort neither occurred on a navigable
waterway nor related to a vessel operating on a navigable waterway, the
locality test was not satisfied and the circuit court found that the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.3"
II. MAINTENANCE AND CURE
In Aksoy v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the calculation of maintenance and cure payments. Aksoy
was a wine steward aboard one of Apollo's passenger vessels who became
ill and was unable to work. Aksoy's wages included tips from passengers
and a monthly income, comprised of base salary and guaranteed
gratuities.4"
When a seaman is injured or becomes ill, he can bring an action for
maintenance and cure that includes three types of recovery. These
include maintenance, which is a living allowance; cure, which is
compensation for medical expenses; and unearned wages, which are the
wages from the date of disability until the expiration of the seaman's

33.
34.
35.
(1995).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 862.
Id. at 864.
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 527
139 F.3d at 865 (citing 513 U.S. at 534).
Id. (quoting 513 U.S. at 534).
Id.
137 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1305.
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employment contract.4 ' Collectively, these are referred to as maintenance and cure.42
When Aksoy became ill, Apollo paid him unearned wages consisting
of his contract wages and the minimum guaranteed gratuity, even
though Aksoy's actual income from gratuities was much more.'
Relying on Flores v. CarnivalCruise Lines, Aksoy argued that he should
have been paid his estimated actual earnings rather than the guaranteed minimum." The court in Flores held that an injured seaman
whose income was based primarily on tips could recover lost tip income
in an action for maintenance and cure because this remedy was designed
to put the seaman in the position he would have been in had he not been
injured.4 5
The district court, granting summary judgment for Apollo, distinguished Flores because Aksoy's employment contract provided for a
guaranteed minimum gratuity, whereas Flores's contract did not.46 The
Eleventh Circuit, reviewing the trial court's order de novo, found that
Aksoy, like Flores, earned a substantial portion of his income from
tips. 47 Additionally, although Aksoy's employment contract provided
for a guaranteed minimum amount of tip income, it did not limit the
amount of that income. 4' The court found that the only way to place
the employee in the same position that he would have been in had he
not been injured was to allow him to recover wages in the amount that
he would have earned during the period of his injury.4 Thus, the court
vacated the order of summary judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings.5"
III.

PERSONAL INJURY

In American Dredging Co. v. Lambert,5 the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed a bench trial decision against American Dredging. The lower
court, applying Florida's Wrongful Death Act,52 awarded damages for

41. Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Archer
v. Trans/American Serv., 834 F.2d 1570, 1575 (11th Cir. 1988)).
42. Id. at 1122.
43. 137 F.3d at 1305.
44. Id. (citing Flores, 47 F.3d 1120, 1127).
45. Id. at 1305-06 (citing Flores, 47 F.3d at 1121-22).
46. Id. at 1305.
47. Id. at 1306.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.

51.

153 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).

52.

FLA. STAT. chs. 327.35 & 327.351 (1995). Chapter 327.351 was repealed in 1996.
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past and future emotional pain and suffering, as well as prejudgment
interest, in an action by the parents and estates of individuals killed in
a boating accident. The claims arose Out of an accident in which a
pleasure craft operated by Lambert and carrying three passengers
collided with an improperly lit dredge pipeline, ejecting the four
occupants from the boat. Three of them were killed.53
American Dredging argued that the district court's award of damages
for emotional pain and suffering under the Florida Wrongful Death Act
conflicted with the long-standing general maritime rule that these
damages were not available to nondependent parents of adult children. 4 This notwithstanding, the Eleventh Circuit held in an earlier
appeal of this case that nonpecuniary damages could be recovered under
Florida law. 5 Thus, the court chose not to revisit this issue.55
American Dredging argued that Lambert was comparatively negligent
because he violated three Florida statutes that were intended to prevent
collisions. These statutes addressed the intoxication of the operator of
a vessel, required vessels to proceed at a safe speed, and required vessels
to maintain a proper lookout.57 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the trial
court's findings on each of these claims under the "clearly erroneous"
standard and upheld the factual findings of the lower court.5"

53. 153 F.3d at 1294.
54. Id. at 1295.
55. See American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 81 F.3d 127, 130-31 (11th Cir. 1996). The
court, following Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996), held that
"no federal statute or common law precedent precludes the personal representatives from
recovering non-pecuniary damages under Florida law." 81 F.3d at 130.
56. This holding may conflict with general maritime law. See In Re Amtrack "Sunset
Ltd." Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1997) (in which the court held that wrongful
death claims were governed by Federal Maritime Law and not Alabama's wrongful death
statute). The court distinguished cases closely related to traditional maritime activity from
those involving pleasure craft. Lambert contains the mixed elements of dredging, a
traditional maritime activity, with a pleasure craft. Id. at 1426. Additionally, the court
in Amtrack, concerned with the maritime law principle of uniformity and attempting to
clarify the Supreme Court's position in Yamaha, did not apply an inconsistent state remedy
to a maritime tort. Id. at 1427. In Yamaha the Court held a state wrongful death statute
to apply to a tort involving pleasure craft because the general maritime law appeared not
to address a situation in which an accident occurred within the territorial waters of a state.
See Yamaha Motors Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 626.
57. FLA. STAT. chs. 327.35, 327.351 (prohibiting the operation of a vessel in Florida
while under the influence of alcohol); 33 U.S.C. § 2006 (1994) (requiring vessels to operate
at a safe speed for the "prevailing circumstances and conditions"); and 33 U.S.C. § 2005
(1994) (requiring vessels to maintain proper lookout).
58. 153 F.3d at 1295.
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's award of prejudgment interest on the damages for past emotional pain and suffering."
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Florida
Wrongful Death Act because it provided the basis for recovery of
damages for emotional pain and suffering.6" Under Florida law, an
award of prejudgment interest is appropriate when a fact finder
determines that the plaintiff suffered an actual out-of-pocket loss prior
to the entry of judgment."
However, because tort damages are
generally uncertain and unliquidated until determination by the fact
finder, awards for prejudgment interest are generally not allowed in
personal injury cases. 2 The Eleventh Circuit found that although the
parents and estates of the decedents were not actual personal injury
plaintiffs, they were like personal injury plaintiffs in that their damages
were uncertain and unliquidated until determined by the court.6 The
district court divided the emotional pain and suffering awards into two
awards, one for past emotional pain and suffering and one for future
emotional pain and suffering." The Eleventh Circuit found that this
division demonstrated an intention to compensate for injuries suffered
over time and not for injuries suffered as of a certain date.65 Therefore,
prejudgment interest on damages for past emotional pain and suffering
was inappropriate.6 6
IV. LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

("LHWCA")
In Brooker v. Durocher Dock & Dredge," the court considered a
question of situs under the LHWCA.6" The question was whether a
seawall was a "pier" for purposes of the LHWCA. Brooker was a welder
working on the construction of a new seawall designed to protect. an
electricity generating plant from the Savannah River. He was injured
when he fell landward off an old seawall which was being replaced.69

59. Id. at 1297.
60. Id. (citing Royster Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 1984)).
61. Id. (citing Alvarado v. Rice, 614 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 1993)).
62. Id. at 1297-98 (citing Griefer v. DiPietro, 708 So. 2d 666, 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Percefull, 653 So. 2d 389,390 (Fla. 1995); Argonaut
Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 1985)).
63. Id. at 1298.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 133 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1998).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 901.
69. 133 F.3d at 1391.
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An administrative law judge ("AW") denied Brooker benefits under the
LHWCA, finding that Brooker failed to meet the "situs" test of the
LHWCA. ' ° The LHWCA requires in part that the injury claimed must
have occurred "upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine
railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in
loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel)."7' The
AUJ held that because the electric plant "'receives no shipment by water
and the seawall is not designed to facilitate either the docking of a
vessel, its loading, unloading, construction or repair,'" it failed to meet
the situs requirement.7 2 The ALJ considered the function of the
seawall but not its location in reaching its conclusion. By operation of
law, the Benefits Review Board ("BRB") deemed the ALJ's decision
affirmed and final because the BRB failed to act on the decision within
one year of Brooker's appeal. 3
In reviewing the case law on the situs issue, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the Ninth Circuit was the only court that had expressly
interpreted the term "pier" under the LHWCA. 4 The Ninth Circuit,
reviewing a case about a structure used to separate oil into water, gas,
and crude oil, and to 'store the crude oil, noted that this structure
"resembled a pier to the extent that it extended from the beach on
pilings and touched the water at high tide."75 The appearance and
location of the structure qualified it as a pier and thus satisfied the situs
The Ninth Circuit's holding focused on the location of the
test."
structure rather than on its function.
The Eleventh Circuit observed that other courts, including the
Supreme Court, had avoided the function versus location dichotomy in
determining whether a "pier" had to be used for customary vessel
activity." The Supreme Court circumvented the issue in Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo7" by finding that "it is not at all clear
that the phrase 'customarily used' was intended to modify more than the

70. Id. at 1392.

71. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)
72.

133 F.3d at 1392 (quoting Brooker v. Durocher Dock & Dredge, No. 93-LHC-2457,

at 1 (Dep't Labor, March 24, 1994)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1393 (citing Hurston v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs,
989 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1993)).

75.
76.
77.
78.

989 F.2d at 1549.
Id. at 1553.
133 F.3d at 1393.
432 U.S. 249, 280 (1977).
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immediately preceding phrase 'other areas."' 79 The Court, however,
found that a pier used for stuffing and stripping containers satisfied the
situs test because it was a part of an "'adjoining
... terminal ...
80
customarily used.., in loading [and] unloading.'"
The Eleventh Circuit had also previously avoided the issue of whether
the phrase "customarily used" modified more than just the "other areas"
portion of section 903(a) of the LHWCA. The Eleventh Circuit held that
an inland facility located five blocks from the pier, which was used for
storage and maintenance of vessel loading equipment, satisfied the situs
test because it constituted another adjoining area customarily used in
vessel activity.8"
The Eleventh Circuit in Brooker also chose not to examine the issue
of whether the pier was required to be customarily used for vessel
activity to satisfy the situs test. Instead, the court focused on whether
a seawall was a pier. 2 The court concluded that a seawall is not a pier
because it does not look like a pier or function like a pier. 3 It found
that the ALJ correctly determined that a seawall is not a pier." The
court also affirmed the AL's finding that a seawall is not an "'other
adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel." 5 The court pointed out
that although a seawall adjoins a navigable waterway, it is not used for
loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel arid,
therefore, is not a covered situs86
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brooker, 7 it was
later dismissed when the case was settled. 8
The Court granted
certiorari because there appeared to be a conflict among the circuits.
Soon after the Eleventh Circuit decided Brooker, the Second Circuit
decided Fleischmann v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation

79. Id.
80. Id. at 281 (brackets in original).
81. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 506-08, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc). The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all affirmed Fifth Circuit
cases decided prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981)
(en banc).
82. 133 F.3d at 1393.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1394.
85. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)).
86. Id.
87. 119 S.Ct. 30 (1998).
88. 119 S.Ct. 390 (1998).
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Programs,9 .which followed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Hurston
and held that a bulkhead constituted a "pier."90
The Ninth Circuit in Hurston, commenting on Congress's failure to
define the term "pier," suggested that Congress intended to "'leave the
geographic areas such as a pier or wharf unlimited so long as they
adjoin navigable waters of the United States.'"' The court in Hurston
examined the purposes of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, which
included the language of the situs requirement in order to provide
coverage to a worker who otherwise would only be covered for injuries
in limited areas. 92 The bulkhead in Fleischmann was similiar to the
seawall in Brooker in that it was not used for loading or unloading cargo
or repairing or constructing a vessel, yet the Second Circuit held that the
bulkhead in Fleischmann was a pier under the LHWCA.93 Therefore,
the split among the circuits remains, and the Supreme Court will likely
grant certiorari again to resolve this issue.
V.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROCEEDINGS

In Bouchard Transportation Co. v. Updegraff,94 the Eleventh Circuit
once again dealt with issues arising from the Tampa Bay oil spill of
August 1993, and specifically the relationship between Rule F95 and the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA '90").96 In Bouchard the owners of
three vessels filed petitions under Rule F of the Supplemental Rules to
limit their liability.9 7 In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
three issues: first, whether the Department of Environmental Protection
of the State of Florida was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity from a Rule F maritime limitation of liability proceeding;
second, whether claims brought under OPA '90 are subject to Rule F
limitation; and third, whether claims brought under Florida's Pollution
Discharge Prevention and Control Act ("FPDPCA) 9" are subject to Rule
F limitation. 99

89. 137 F.3d 131 (1998).
90. Id. at 139.
91. Id. at 138-39 (quoting Hurston, 989 F.2d at 1551).
92. Id. at 139 (citing Hurston, 989 F.2d at 1552).
93. Id.
94. 147 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1998).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims,
Rule F.
96. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
97. 147 F.3d at 1347.
98. FLA. STAT. ch. 376.011-.17, 376.19 -.21 (1995).
99. Bouchard Transp. Co., 147 F.3d at 1346.
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With regard to the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that no court of appeals had ever addressed the
issue.'0 0 In 1998 the Supreme Court in California v. Deep Sea Research'' reviewed the application of the Eleventh Amendment in the
context of an in rem maritime proceeding.0 2 The Eleventh Amendment prevents a citizen of a state from filing suit in federal court against
that state.' 0 3 In Deep Sea Research, an in rem proceeding under Rule
C, the Supreme Court held that when a state does not have possession of the res in issue, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal
jurisdiction. 10 5
The Eleventh Circuit noted that Bouchard was not an in rem
action. 106 However, like an in rem case, "the plaintiffs in the limitation proceeding neither named any specific entities as defendants in
their complaints nor formally served process on any defendants."" 7
Because plaintiffs in the limitation proceedings filed security bonds with
the district court, and Florida did not have possession of those bonds
(the res), Florida was not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from
the limitation of liability action.'
With regard to limitation of liability for OPA '90 claims, the Eleventh
Circuit found that Rule F did not apply.'0 9 Rule F does not specify to
which limitation statutes it applies."0 As a result, the owners of the
vessels argued that the procedural aspects of Rule F apply to all
limitation statutes and that OPA '90 was a limitation statute."' The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that while OPA '90 is a limitation
statute in the sense that it limits a shipowner's liability, it is not a
limitation statute with regard to the amount of money that may be
recovered by claimants.'12 The court held that every claim must be
paid in full through the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund mechanism of
The court also noted that a conflict exists between the
OPA '90.11

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
Rule C.
105.

Id. at 1348.
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1464 (1998).
Id. at 1467.
147 F.3d at 1349 (citing Deep Sea Research, 118 S. Ct. at 1470).
FED. R. CIv. P. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims,
147 F.3d at 1349.

106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1350.
at 1349.
at 1350.
at 1352.
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general procedures of Rule F limitations and the procedures of OPA
'90.114 The court followed the fundamental principle of statutory
construction that when resolving a conflict between two statutes, the
specific statute takes precedence over the more general one." 5 In this
case, OPA '90 contained specific procedures for specific types of incidents
while Rule F procedures were more general. The court further noted the
principle of avoiding statutory constructions that render provisions
insignificant." 6 For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit found that
claims brought under OPA '90 must follow 7the procedures prescribed in
that statute rather than those in Rule F.1
Finally, with regard to claims brought under the FPDPCA, the court
found that, like OPA '90, the FPDPCA did not limit the recovery
The FPDPCA established the Florida
available to claimants." 8
Coastal Protection Trust Fund to ensure full payment of all claims and
specified procedures which take precedence over a general limitation
the
scheme such as Rule F." 9 Therefore, claims brought under
20
FPDPCA are not subject to limitation of liability under Rule F.'
VI.

CARGO ISSUES

In Itel Container Corp. v. MIV TITAN SCAN,' 2' the shipper of new
refrigerated containers sued the nonvessel operating common carrier
("NVOCC") and the ocean carrier to recover damages for containers that
were lost overboard or damaged during ocean transit from Japan to the
United States. The NVOCC cross-claimed for indemnity against the
ocean carrier.'2 2 The district court held, and the parties did not
contest on appeal, that the NVOCC breached its contract of carriage
with the shipper and was liable for the resulting cargo damage and, in
turn, that the ocean carrier must indemnify the NVOCC. 123 However,
construing as separate and independent the contracts of carriage
between the shipper and the NVOCC on the one hand, and the NVOCC
and ocean carrier on the other, the district court held that the NVOCC's
liability was limited by the package limitation set forth in England's

114. Id. at 1351.
115. Id. (citing San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1996)).
116. Id. (citing WoodFork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 970-71
(5th Cir. 1981)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1352.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Itel Container Corp. v. M/V "Titan Scan," 139 F.3d 1450 (11th Cir. 1998).
122. Id. at 1451-52.
123. Id. at 1452.
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Hague-Visby Rules.'24 The district court further held that the ocean
carrier's liability to the NVOCC was limited by the package limitation
12
of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("U.S. COGSA"). 1
Because U.S. COGSA's liability limit is less than that provided by the
Hague-Visby Rules, the NVOCC
was not fully indemnified for the
12
amount adjudged against it.

The NVOCC appealed, asserting that the district court erred in finding
that the NVOCC's liability to the shipper was governed by the HagueVisby Rules whereas the ocean carrier's liability to the NVOCC was
governed by U.S. COGSA. 127 The NVOCC argued that no legal basis
existed for distinguishing between the two contracts of carriage because
"they were intentionally created as 'back to back' contracts to be
governed in all aspects by the same statutory regime. "121 The NVOCC
also asserted that the district court erred in finding that the 29HagueVisby Rules governed its contract of carriage with the shipper.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the
two contracts of carriage were separate transactions. 3 ' The court
reasoned that the shipper and ocean carrier had no communication
during the negotiations for the respective contracts of carriage and that
the NVOCC failed to include any language in the contracts 3that would
justify evaluating the two contracts as a single transaction.1 '
In affirming the district court's conclusion that the Hague-Visby Rules
applied to the shipper/NVOCC contract, the Eleventh Circuit relied on
several clauses in the bill of lading.'32 The court found that the clause
paramount required application of Japanese COGSA 3 3 The court also

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Id. The NVOCC asserted that while the parties agreed that English law would
govern the contract of carriage, thnt law would require application of Japan's Carriage of
Goods By Sea Act ("Japanese COGSA") to the contract, not England's Hague-Visby Rules.
Id. During the time relevant to the lawsuit, Japan had not yet adopted the Hague-Visby
Rules with its higher package limitation. Id. at 1451 n.1.
130. Id. at 1453.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1454.
133. Id.
"The Hague Rules contained in the International Convention for the Unification
of certain rules relating to Bills of Lading ... as enacted in the country of
shipment shall apply to this contract. When no such enactment is in force in the
country of shipment, the corresponding legislation of the country of destination
shall apply, but in respect of shipments to which no such enactments are
compulsorily applicable the terms of the said Convention shall apply.
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found that the choice of forum clause,' 3 ' which required application of
the law of the carrier's principal place of business, required application
of English law because the NVOCC's place of business was London,
England.13 5 A clause in the typewritten addendum to the contract of
carriage provided for application of "'English law.'" 136
To resolve the conflict between these clauses, the Eleventh Circuit
applied rules of contract construction which provide that "specific clauses
take precedence over general ones, and clauses that have been added by
the parties preempt form provisions."3
The court held that the
typewritten clause "'English law to apply'" was a specific clause that
preempted the boilerplate clause paramount.'" ' The court also held
that the boilerplate forum selection clause was more specific than the
clause paramount.'39 Thus, the court concluded that English law
applied to the shipper/NVOCC bill of lading."
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that U.S.
COGSA governed the NVOCC/ocean carrier contract of carriage."'
The court held that "[w]hile the [NVOCC/ocean carrier] situation is
marginally different from the [shipper/NVOCC] situation, we do not
think the differences between the two situations constitute adequate
grounds upon which to distinguish the statutory schemes applicable to
the liability limits of the [English Hague-Visby Rules]."" 2 The court
noted that, like the shipper/NVOCC contract of carriage, the clause
paramount in the NVOCC/ocean carrier bill of lading required application of Japanese COGSA and, as contained in the addendum, provided

Trades where Hague-Visby Rules apply. In trades where ... the Hague-Visby
Rules [ ] apply compulsorily, the provisions of the respective legislation shall be

considered incorporated in this Bill of Lading.'"
Id.
134. "Any dispute arising under the Bill of Lading shall be decided in the country
where the carrier has his principal place of business, and the laws of such country shall
apply except as provided elsewhere herein." Id.
135. Id. The carrier, for purposes of the shipper/NVOCC contract of carriage, was the
NVOCC. The NVOCC's principal place of business was England. Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 1455.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court also held that the forum selection clause, in conjunction with the

typewritten clause providing for application of English law, satisfied "Article X(c) of the

Hague-Visby Rules, which provides that the Hague-Visby Rules apply if 'the contract
contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading provides that these Rules or legislation of

any State giving effect to them are to govern the contract.'" Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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for application of English law." The court found that the only ground
for distinguishing between the contracts was the forum selection clause,
which required application of the law of the carrier's principal place of
business.'" Because the ocean carrier's principal place of business
was the Netherlands, the forum selection clause required application of
Dutch law. 45 Because the Netherlands, like England, had adopted the
Hague-Visby Rules, application of Dutch law would also result in the
higher liability limits of the Hague-Visby Rules.'" The court concluded, therefore, that no basis existed for differentiating between the two
contracts of carriage.' 47 Because the Hague-Visby Rules applied to
both, the NVOCC enjoyed complete indemnity from the ocean carrier for
the amount adjudged against it.14
Hale Container Line, Inc v. Houston Sea Packing Co.,'" was a
multiclaim lawsuit that arose from two voyages in which mobile homes
were transported from Tampa, Florida to French Guyana. Societe
Guayanaise De Coneils Immobiliers ("SOGUCI"), which had contracted
with the European Space Agency to provide housing for workers
constructing a space center in French Guyana, contracted with Project
Logistics and Transporation, Inc. ("Project Logistics") to arrange for the
ocean transportation of the homes. Project Logistics then contacted a
shipping agency, Meridian Shipping, Inc. ("Meridian"), which, in turn,
contacted Houston Sea Packing Co. ("Houston") for the transportation of
the homes and the construction of a stanchion assembly to hold the
homes during shipment.'O
On August 28, 1989, Hale Container Line, Inc. ("Hale"), as "owner,"
and Houston, as "charterer," entered into a time charter party whereby
Houston chartered a tug and barge from Hale. The charter party
contained an acknowledgment that Houston intended to add a stanchion
assembly to the barge and that Houston would be responsible for, and
indemnify Hale, for any claims arising from the stanchions. 5 '
The first shipment of mobile homes departed Tampa on September 23,
1989. Upon arrival of the tug and barge in French Guyana, it was
discovered that the stanchions and supports for the mobile homes had
bent, causing damage to some of the mobile homes. As a result of the

143. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 1455-56.
Id. at 1456.
Id.

148. Id.
149. 137 F.3d 1455 (11th Cir. 1998).
150. Id. at 1460.
151. Id. at 1461.
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failure of the stanchion assembly, SOGUCI advised Houston and Project
Logistics that it would require a survey of the tug and tow before
departure of the second shipment. Houston hired a surveyor to ensure
that the mobile homes were properly secured prior to the commencement
of the second voyage. At the conclusion of loading operations for the
second shipment, the surveyor issued a document stating that all of the
mobile homes had been properly secured aboard the barge.152
While the vessels carrying the second shipment of homes were en
route to French Guyana, some of the mobile homes on the stanchion
assembly shifted. Hale then instructed the master of the tug to call at
Martinique. While the vesaels were in Martinique, SOGUCI commenced
legal proceedings against the vessels because of a dispute with Hale
concerning the manner in which the mobile homes would be transported
to French Guyana. The vessels were held under arrest in Martinique
from December 8 to December 29, 1989. During this time, fifteen mobile
homes were discharged from the barge and transported to French
Guyana on another vessel. The tug and barge eventually arrived in
French Guyana in January 1990, where it was discovered that several
of the mobile homes
had sustained damage due to the apparent failure
53
of the stanchions. 1

Hale sued Houston seeking recovery of unpaid charter hire, fuel and
lube expenses, indemnification for any sums due the cargo interests in
SOGUCI's pending lawsuit in Martinique, $70,895.38 for expenses
incurred during the vessels' emergency call at Martinique, and $100,000
in lost profits.

4

SOGUCI filed a complaint against Houston and other

parties seeking $700,000 for damages to the mobile homes."'
The district court entered judgment for Hale and the vessels on
SOGUCI's claims against them."M The district court also entered
judgment for SOGUCI against Houston for $337,049.52.1 7 Houston
and SOGUCI appealed.'
A.

"Carrier"Status Under U.S. COGSA
Houston argued on appeal that the district court erred in concluding
that it was not entitled to assert U.S. COGSA's package limitation

152. Id. at 1462.
153. Id. at 1463-64.
154. Id. at 1464. Houston also sought indemnification, damages for detention, loss of
profit, port charges, pilotage, and stevedoring charges from other parties. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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because it was not a "carrier" within the meaning of U.S. COGSA.' 59
Houston also asserted the district court erred in finding that it was not
entitled to assert the package limitation by Virtue of the bills of ladings'
Himalaya clause because it was not an independent contractor of the
"carrier," Project Logistics."6° SOGUCI argued on appeal that the
district court erred in finding that the vessels, in rem, constituted U.S.
COGSA "carriers."'6 ' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
findings as to these issues.' 62
The Eleventh Circuit noted that U.S. COGSA defines a "carrier" as
1
The
"the owner or charterer who enters into a contract of carriage."'3
court stated that "[a] charterer may be a 'carrier' as established by the
vessel's charter, its acts of accepting and loading goods into containers
owned by the charterer, and issuance of the bill of lading."' 6' The court
concluded that the evidence supported the district court's finding that
Houston was not a "carrier" within the meaning of U.S. COGSA.'"
The court found that Houston was not a party to the July 31, 1989
booking note issued for the shipments and, moreover, was not a party to
the bills of lading issued for the cargo.' 66 The court held that "[tihere
was no evidence presented that showed that Project Logistics entered
into a contract of carriage or bill of lading with Houston, consented to
act on its behalf as an agent, or was in privity with
have Houston
7
Houston.

" 16

The court then addressed Houston's argument that it was an
independent contractor of the carrier, Project Logistics, and therefore
could find refuge under the Himalaya clause of the bills of lading."6
While cautioning that such clauses are strictly construed, the court
noted that a Himalaya clause may expressly extend the defenses and
169
protections of U.S. COGSA to a carrier's agents and contractors.
whether a party is
The court then set forth guidelines for determining
17 0
an intended beneficiary of a Himalaya clause.

159. Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

169. Id.
170.

Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

1464-65.
1464.
1468.
1464 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1994)).
1465.
1466.

at 1465.
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A reference to a class of persons such as "agents" and "independent
contractors" clearly indicates that the contract includes all persons
engaged by the carrier to perform the functions and duties of the
carrier within the scope of the carriage contract, and no further clarity,
such as enumeration of the parties, is necessary."'
The court also set forth guidelines for determining whether a party is an
independent contractor as referenced in a Himalaya clause: "a court
should (1) compare the nature of the services provided by the party with
the carrier's responsibilities under the bill of lading or contract of
carriage, and (2) consider whether the independent contractor's duty had
been fulfilled at the time when the liability was incurred."'7 2 Moreover, "a contractor will be entitled to the benefits of a Himalaya clause
where there is a manifest consent by the carrier that the contractor shall
act on its behalf and subject to its control, and consent by the contractor
" 173

to so act.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Houston
was neither an agent nor a contractor of the carrier, Project Logistics. 1 7 4 The court noted that Houston was not directly employed by
Project Logistics, received no payment for services provided to Project
Logistics, had no contractual relationship with Project Logistics, and,
finally, that Project Logistics did not consent to have Houston act on its
behalf.'75
Addressing whether the carrying vessels were U.S. COGSA "carriers,"
the court noted that a "vessel is a 'carrier,' and thus liable under [U.S.]
COGSA, where (1) the ship transported and discharged the cargo; (2) the
bill of lading was issued 'for the master'; (3) no contractual relationship
existed which absolved the ship and its owner from liability for the
cargo."' 76 Utilizing this analysis, the court affirmed the district court's
conclusion that the carrying vessels were U.S. COGSA carriers because
of each
(1) the vessels transported the mobile homes; and (2) "the master
" 177
voyage, by transporting the cargo, ratified the bills of lading.
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Due Diligence and Deviation Under U.S. COGSA
SOGUCI asserted on appeal that the district court erred in finding
that the vessels (1) exercised due diligence in loading and stowing the
mobile homes for the second voyage; (2) were not liable for the costs
associated with discharging the fifteen mobile homes in Martinique and
transhipping the homes to French Guyana on a different vessel; and (3)
were entitled to limit their liability pursuant to U.S. COGSA's package
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court on the
limitation.'
first two issues but did not address the package limitation issue. 79
The Eleventh Circuit held that "[tihe duty to load, stow, and discharge
cargo in the carriage of goods under a time charter is on the ship and its
owner."8 o The court affirmed the district court's finding that Hale
exercised due diligence "'to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel with
respect to the stanchion system.'"'8 ' The court noted that under the
terms of the time charter party, Houston, the time charterer, was
responsible for the stanchion system. 82 The court also noted that
Houston retained a surveyor, as required by SOGUCI, to confirm that
the mobile homes were properly stowed prior to the sailing of the
vessels." The surveyor issued a document confirming proper stowage
of the mobile homes and SOGUCI, accepting that document, permitted
the vessels to sail."& Thus, the court reasoned, the master of the
vessel reasonably relied upon the surveyor's findings with respect to the
stanchion system.'
The court then addressed the issue of deviation, clarifying the doctrine
as "provid[ing] that, when a ship deviates from the contract of carriage
or varies the conduct in the carriage of goods, increasing the risk of
shipment of the goods, COGSA does not apply because the bill of lading,
which acts as the contract of carriage, is nullified."' The court noted
that "[w]here a ship leaves port badly stowed or unseaworthy, courts
have held that the ship did not deviate in seeking a port of refuge."8 7
Moreover, "a ship's master is empowered to exercise his good faith

B.

178. Id. at 1468.
179. Id. at 1470. Because the court concluded that the vessels, in rem, were not liable
under U.S. COGSA, it refused to consider the package limitation issue. Id.
180. Id. at 1468.
181. Id. at 1469.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1469-70.
184. Id. at 1470.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 1469.
187. Id.
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judgment during his command where the safety of the crew, vessel and
cargo are concerned."'"
The court affirmed the district court's finding that the offloading of the
fifteen mobile homes from the vessel in Martinique because of concerns
about the soundness of the stanchion system did not constitute a
deviation.1 The court noted that the master was entitled to "exercise
his good faith judgment where the safety of the cargo was involved" and
therefore, while the offloading of the mobile homes "may have been a
change in the time charter, it was not a 'deviation.'"' 1

188. Id.
189. Id. at 1470.
190. Id.

